1 – About the Data Protection Bill: GS II

Topic à Government Policies and Interventions

·       Context:

·       The Personal Data Protection Bill was withdrawn from Parliament by the government in order to provide a “complete legislative framework” for controlling the online world. Separate regulations on data privacy, the internet ecosystem as a whole, cybersecurity, telecom rules, and the use of non-personal data to promote innovation in the country are all included in this framework.

·       Important recommendations:

·       To reflect this change, the “Personal Data Protection Billpresent “‘s title needs to be updated. This is designed to imply that in order to better protect privacy, the bill will also address non-personal data, such as personal data that has been anonymized.

·       “Sensitive personal information shall not be shared with any foreign government or agency unless such sharing is allowed by the federal government,” should be the new wording in the section that forbids the transmission of personal information outside of India.

·       Until the parent company, which owns the technology that powers the platform’s services, has a presence in India, no social media platform should be allowed to operate there.

·       It advocates setting up a distinct regulatory body with the exclusive purpose of regulating the media.

·       Any person who reidentifies de-identified data risks up to a 3-year prison sentence, a Rs. 2 lakh fine, or both.

·       The name of the Bill ought to be altered to “personalization.”

·       The central government may only exempt any government agency from the legislation in unusual circumstances.

·       How do these suggestions compare to EU law?

·       The JCP’s recommendations for the Personal Data Protection Bill are very similar to international standards like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation in a number of aspects.

·       Similarities:

·       Users must provide their informed consent in order to opt in or out of how their data is processed.

·       Breach: The authorities must be notified of a breach within 72 hours of the revelation.

·       Before the obligations of the GDPR come into force, there is a two-year transition period.

·       According to EU law, a “data fiduciary” is any individual, whether they are human or legal, as well as any governmental body, organisation, or institution that determines the objectives and techniques for processing personal data. NGOs in India are also included.

·       The committee has recommended creating a Data Protection Authority (DPA):

·       The Data Protection Authority will handle both personal and non-personal data (DPA).

·       DPA membership: The Union government will choose the DPA’s chairperson and other members based on recommendations made by a selection committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary.

·       The group will also comprise the secretary for law and IT as well as the Indian attorney general.

·       An independent expert and one director from each of the IIT and the IIM are among the members that the Center has suggested.

·       Additional noteworthy items include:

·       The law aims to define the flow and use of personal data, safeguard the privacy of persons whose information is processed, create a framework for international transfers, hold data processors accountable, and suggest remedies for improper and harmful processing.

·       The opposition MPs who submitted their dissent notes have passionately criticised the bill’s intention to provide the government the power to exempt its investigative agencies from the restrictions of the law.

Source à The Indian Express

2 – Details of the ssAnti Doping Bill:GS II

Topic à Government Policies and Interventions

·       Context:

·       The Indian Parliament yesterday adopted a bill to provide a legislative framework for the National Anti-Doping Agency (NADA) and National Dope Testing Laboratory.

·       What are the Main Elements of the Bill?

·       The Bill forbids the use of doping in competitive sports by athletes, athlete support personnel, and other individuals.

·       Consequences of Violations:

·       Violations of the anti-doping rules may result in results being thrown out, the forfeiture of medals, points, and prizes, the ineligibility to compete in an event for a predetermined period of time, financial penalties, etc.

·       The Bill describes how to establish the National Anti-Doping Agency as a statutory authority and provides the organisation with a legal foundation.

·       It will be led by a Director General selected by the federal government. The Agency’s responsibilities include encouraging anti-doping research and organising, carrying out, and managing anti-doping programmes. Additionally, it looks into violations of the anti-doping rules.

·       National Board for Anti-Doping in Sports: The legislation establishes the National Board for Anti-Doping in Sports, which will advise the government on anti-doping regulations and the observance of international anti-doping agreements.

·       The Board will oversee and give direction to the Agency’s operations.

·       Dope Testing Laboratories: It is assumed that the principal dope testing laboratory is the current National Dope Testing Facility.

·       The federal government might build more National Dope Testing Laboratories.

·       What is the significance of the Bill?

·       The legislation aims to give athletes time-bound justice while also enhancing agency coordination in the war against doping.

·       Additionally, it seeks to increase India’s resolve to maintain its international promises to promote healthy competition.

·       The legislation would aid in the creation of a trustworthy, unbiased mechanism for anti-doping adjudication.

·       What Issues Do You Have With the Bill?

·       Additionally, the National Dope Testing Laboratory (NDTL) and NADA would receive legal recognition under this bill.

·       The Director General’s qualifications must be disclosed by rules because they are not specified in the Bill.

·       The federal government has the right to fire the director general for wrongdoing, incompetence, or “any other ground.”

·       The independence of the Director General would be compromised by giving the central government control over these sections.

·       Additionally, this goes against the World Anti-Doping Agency’s rule requiring operational independence for these organisations.

·       The Disciplinary Panel and Appeal Panel members may be terminated by the Board under the Bill for grounds that will be specified in regulations rather than the Bill.

·       There is also no requirement to give them an opportunity to be heard. This could make it difficult for these panels to function independently.

·       NADA:

·       To establish drug-free sports in India, the National Anti-Doping Agency (NADA) was incorporated as a society on November 24, 2005, in accordance with the Societies Registration Act of 1860.

·       The major objectives are to control the dope control programme, enforce anti-doping laws in compliance with the WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency) code, support education and research, and increase public awareness of doping and its adverse effects.

·       The NADA is responsible for organising, organising, implementing, monitoring, and pushing improvements in doping control. Cooperating with other relevant national organisations, agencies, and anti-doping organisations is one of the additional roles.

·       WADA:

·       The International Olympic Committee (IOC) created the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in November 1999.

·       WADA is acknowledged by the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sports (2005).

·       The primary duty of WADA is to establish, harmonise, and coordinate anti-doping regulations for all nations and sports.

·       Investigations of doping incidents, doping research, and adequate communication of anti-doping rules to athletes and other necessary employees are all carried out in accordance with the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA Code) and its standards.

Source à The Hindu

3 – About the Fair and Remunerative Price:GS III

Topic à Indian Agriculture

·       Context:

·       In a meeting held here on Wednesday under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) of sugarcane for the sugar season 2022–23 (October–September). 305 per quintal is the FRP. Sugarcane, which has a basic sugar recovery rate of 10.25 percent, is where the money comes from. The Center has also established a premium of 3.05 per quintal for every 0.1 percent increase in sugar recovery over and above 10.25 percent as well as a 3.05 per quintal decrease in FRP for every 0.1 percent decrease in recovery.

·       Details of the FRP:

·       FRP is the regulated price that the government mandates mills pay farmers for the cane that they purchase from them.

·       Through the use of a contract with mills, farmers have the option to pay the FRP in instalments.

·       When payments are late, interest fees of up to 15% per year may apply. Additionally, the sugar commissioner may seize mill assets to recover unpaid FRP as revenue recovery dues.

·       According to the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966, which was issued under the Essential Commodities Act (ECA), 1955, FRP is required to be paid across the country within 14 days of the date the cane was delivered.

·       Following the proposal of the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs made the announcement (CCEA).

·       CACP is the name of a division within the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. As an advisory body, the government is not compelled to take its recommendations into consideration.

·       The organisation is presided over by the Prime Minister of India.

·       The FRP was built on the findings of the study on sugarcane industry restructuring conducted by the Rangarajan Committee.

·       What elements are taken into account when the FRP is announced?

·       Sugarcane production costs:

·       Returning to the trend of agricultural commodity pricing and alternative crop growers, sugar is given to customers at a fair price.

·       The cost at which producers of sugar sell their sugar that is made from sugarcane.

·       Molasses, bagasse, and press mud are examples of byproducts that might bring in a profit or have their worth attributed to them.

·       Sugarcane farmers should have enough margins to cover earnings and risk.

·       Payment options for FRP:

·       The FRP is based on the sugar-recovery capacity of the cane.

·       FRP has been established at Rs 2,900 per tonne at a base recovery of 10% for the sugar season of 2021–2022.

·       Sugar recovery is the proportion of sugar produced to cane crushed that is expressed as a percentage.

·       Higher FRP and sugar production are the results of higher recovery.

·       Details of the sugarcane crop:

·       21 to 27 degrees Celsius, humid and sticky.

·       Between 75 and 100 cm of rain fall.

·       Deep, rich loam makes up the soil.

·       Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Bihar produce the most sugarcane.

·       India is the second-largest producer of sugarcane after Brazil.

·       As long as the soil has sufficient drainage, it can be grown on any type of soil, from clay loam to sandy loam.

·       From planting to harvesting, manual labour is necessary.

·       It is the main producer of sugar, molasses, khandsari, and gur (jaggery).

·       The National Policy on Biofuels and the Scheme for Extending Financial Assistance to Sugar Undertakings (SEFASU) are two government initiatives to support the cultivation of sugarcane and the sugar sector.

Source à The Indian Express

4 – Details of the Central Vigilance Commissioner:GS II

Topic à Constitutional Bodies

·       Context:

·       On Wednesday, Suresh N. Patel was named the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC), filling the job that had been empty for a year.

·       History of CVC:

·       The Central Vigilance Commission was established as a result of the Santhanam Committee’s recommendations, and the 2003 CVC Act granted it legal status. Its goal was to abolish governmental corruption and hold public servants accountable for their dishonest actions.

·       The CVC’s objectives are:

·       It is considered as the coordinating body for efforts to fight corruption in the All India Services, Central Services, PSUs, and other departments.

·       In corruption cases, it is in responsibility of the Delhi Special Police.

·       It looks at the prosecution warrants issued by the government.

·       Discipline against senior Group A, Group B, All India Services, etc. personnel is suggested.

·       It serves as the main hub for the fight against corruption on a national level.

·       Effectiveness of CVC:

·       The CVC has demonstrated success in preventing corruption in accordance with its objective. It has done the following things in the past to prove this.

·       Significant officers have previously been appointed to various positions with ease as a result of it.

·       It has previously taken impressive action against top employees, lawmakers, and high-ranking authorities.

·       It hosts Vigilance Week each year to spread awareness of the risks associated with corruption.

·       It can carry out “Suo Moto” and acts as a court for civil disputes.

·       The CVC’s independence is maintained because it is chosen by a fair committee composed of the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, etc.

·       Several problems faced by CVC:

·       The expectation that CVC would be an organisation that could act as a “One Stop Solution” to fight corruption in the country has, however, been proven false due to the following ineffectiveness.

·       The ministries and organisations are not compelled to follow the CVC’s rulings.

·       A very low conviction rate has reduced CVC’s influence and effectiveness.

·       Due to the lengthy nature of the cases handled by CVC, it is ineffectual as a deterrent.

·       CVC is generally viewed as a hopeless agency because it is only recognised as an advisory body and lacks the power to direct the CBI to launch investigations into any individual with the rank of Joint Secretary or higher.

·       Despite operating in a “somewhat autonomous” manner, the CVC lacks the funding and power necessary to pursue allegations of corruption.

·       Most of the time, it is difficult to determine the domains and jurisdictions of the organisations.

·       Diversity in the workplace causes task duplication and reduces performance.

·       The Central Vigilance Commissioner position hasn’t been filled in a very long time.

·       The CVC and other existing organisations can no longer effectively combat the corruption issue, necessitating the creation of new institutions like the Lokpal. The CVC’s power in relation to its mandate, financial independence, and expansion of its ordinarily constrained advisory role need to be questioned.

Source à The Hindu